Helping our governments – differently

… we may live in a new security and terrorism landscape

Two weeks ago, I didn’t write a full post, because the Manchester arena bombing was too raw.  We are only a few days on from the London Bridge attack, and I could make the same decision, but think it’s time to recognise that we have a new reality that we need to face in Britain: that we may live in a new security and terrorism landscape.  The sorts of attacks – atrocities – that have been perpetrated over the past few weeks (and the police and security services say that despite three succeeding, they’ve foiled another five) are likely to keep happening.

And they’re difficult to predict, which means that they’re difficult to stop.  There are already renewed calls for tech companies* to provide tools to allow the Good Guys[tm**] to read the correspondence of the people who are going to commit terrorist acts.  The problem is that the preferred approach requested/demanded by governments seems to be backdoors in encryption and/or communications software, which just doesn’t work – see my post The Backdoor Fallacy – explaining it slowly for governments.  I understand that “reasonable people” believe that this is a solution, but it really isn’t, for all sorts of reasons, most of which aren’t really that technical at all.

So what can we do?  Three things spring to mind, and before I go into them, I’d like to make something clear, and it’s that I have a huge amount of respect for the men and women who make up our security services and intelligence community.  All those who I’ve met have a strong desire to perform their job to the best of their ability, and to help protect us from people and threats which could damage us, our property, and our way of life.  Many of these people and threats we know nothing about, and neither do we need to.  The job that the people in the security services do is vital, and I really don’t see any conspiracy to harm us or take huge amounts of power because it’s there for the taking.  I’m all for helping them, but not at the expense of the rights and freedoms that we hold dear.  So back to the question of what we can do.  And by “we” I mean the nebulous Security Community****.  Please treat these people with respect, and be aware they they work very, very hard, and often in difficult and stressful jobs*****.

The first is to be more aware of our environment.  We’re encouraged to do this in our daily lives (“Report unaccompanied luggage”…), but what more could we do in our professional lives?  Or what could we do in our daily lives by applying our professional capabilities and expertise to everyday activities?  What suspicious activities – from traffic on networks from unexpected place to new malware – might be a precursor to something else?  I’m not saying that we’re likely to spot the next terrorism attack – though we might – but helping to combat other crime more effectively both reduces the attack surface for terrorists and increases the available resourcing for counter-intelligence.

Second: there are, I’m sure, many techniques that are available to the intelligence community that we don’t know about.  But there is a great deal of innovation within enterprise, health and telco (to choose three sectors that I happen to know quite well******) that could well benefit our security services.  Maybe your new network analysis tool, intrusion detector, data aggregator has some clever smarts in it, or creates information which might be of interest to the security community.  I think we need to be more open to the idea of sharing these projects, products and skills – proactively.

The third is information sharing.  I work for Red Hat, an Open Source company which also tries to foster open thinking and open management styles.  We’re used to sharing, and industry, in general, is getting better about sharing information with other organisations, government and the security services.  We need to get better at sharing both active data from systems which are running as designed and bad data from systems that are failing, under attack or compromised.  Open, I firmly believe, should be our default state*******.

If we get better at sharing information and expertise which can help the intelligence services in ways which don’t impinge negatively on our existing freedoms, maybe we can reduce the calls for laws that will do so.  And maybe we can help stop more injuries, maimings and deaths.  Stand tall, stand proud.  We will win.


*who isn’t a tech company, these days, though?  If you sell home-made birthday cards on Etsy, or send invoices via email, are you a tech company?  Who knows.

**this an ironic tm***

***not that I don’t think that there are good guys – and gals – but just that it’s difficult to define them.  Read on: you’ll see.

****I’ve talked about this before – some day I’ll define it.

*****and most likely for less money than most of the rest of us.

******feel free to add or substitute your own.

*******OK, DROP for firewall and authorisation rules, but you get my point.