Lots of people in the InfoSec world are at Black Hat and Def Con in Las Vegas this week, and there are more stories out there than you can shake a stick at. I’m on holiday, and although it’s not as if I’m disinterested, I’ve decided to take the whole “not working” thing seriously, and I’m not going to blog about any of them this week.
I ended up reporting a possible breach of data. My data
Since the first appearance of GDPR, I’ve strenuously avoided any direct interaction with it if at all possible. In particular, I’ve been careful to ensure that nobody is under any illusion that my role involves any responsibility for our company’s implementation of GDPR. In this I have been largely successful. I say largely, because the people who send spam don’t seem to have noticed: I suspect that anybody with the word “security” in their title has had a similar experience.
Of course, I have a decent idea what GDPR is supposed to be about: making sure that data that organisations hold about people is only used as it should be, is kept up to date, and that people can find out what exactly what information relating to them exactly is held.
This week, I got more involved GDPR than I’d expected: I ended up reporting a possible breach of data. My data. As it happens, my experience with the process was pretty good: so good, in fact, that I think it’s worth giving it as an example.
A bit of scene-setting. I live in the UK, which is (curently) in the EU, and which means that, like pretty much all companies and organisations here, it is subject to the GDPR. Last week, I had occasion to email a department within local government about an issue around services in my area. Their website had suggested that they’d get back to me within 21 days or so, so I was slightly (and pleasantly) surprised when they replied within 5.
The email started so well: the title referred to the village in which I live.
It went downhill from there. “Dear Mr Benedict”, it ran. I should be clear that I had used my actual name (which is not Benedict) for the purposes of this enquiry, so this was something of a surprise. “Oh, well,” I thought to myself, “they’ve failed to mail merge the name field properly.” I read on. “Here is the information you have requested about Ambridge…”. I do not live in Ambridge. So far, this was just annoying: clearly the department had responded to the wrong query. But it got worse. “In particular regards to your residence, Willow Farm, Ambridge…”
The department had sent me information which allowed me to identify Mr Benedict and his place of residence. They had also failed to send me the information that I had requested. What worried me more was that this might well not be an isolated event. There was every chance that my name and address details had been sent to somebody else, and even that there was a cascade effect of private details being sent to email address after email address. I mentioned this in annoyance to my wife – and she was the one to point out that it was a likely breach of GDPR. “You should report it,” she said.
So I went to the local government office website and had a quick look around it. Nothing obvious for reporting GDPR breaches. I phoned the main number and got through to enquiries. “I’d like to report a possible data breach, please,” I said. “Could you put me through to whoever covers GDPR?”
To be honest, this was where I thought it would all go wrong. It didn’t. The person on the enquiries desk asked for more information. I explained what department it was, about the email, and the fact that somebody else’s details had been exposed to me, I strongly suspected in breach of GDPR.
“Let me just see if I can find someone in our data team,” she said, and put me on hold.
I don’t know if you’ve ever been put on hold by someone in a local government office, but it’s rarely an event that should be greeted with rejoicing. I prepared myself for a long wait, and was surprised when I was put through to someone fairly quickly.
The man to whom I spoke knew what he was doing. In fact, he did an excellent job. He took my details, he took details of the possible breach, he reassured me that this would be investigated. He was polite, and seemed keen to get to the bottom of the affair. He also immediately grasped what the problem was, and agreed that it needed to be investigated. I’m not sure whether I was the first person ever to call up and so this was an adrenaline-fuelled roller coaster ride into uncharted territory for him, or whether this was a routine conversation in the office, but he pitched his questions and responses at exactly the right level. I offered to forward the relevant email to him so that he had the data himself. He accepted. The last point was the one that impressed me the most. “Could you please delete the email from your system?” he asked. This was absolutely the right request. I agreed and did so.
And how slowly do the wheels of local government grind? How long would it take me to get a response to my query?
I received a response the next day, from the department concerned. They assured me that this was a one-off problem, that my personal data had not been compromised, and that there had not been a widespread breach, as I had feared. They even sent me the information I had initially requested.
My conclusions from this? They’re two-fold:
- From an individual’s point of view: yes, it is worth reporting breaches. Action can, and should be taken. If you don’t get a good response, you may need to escalate, but you have rights, and organisations have responsibilities: exercise those rights, and hold the organisations to account. You may be pleasantly surprised by the outcome, as I was.
- From an organisation’s point of view: make sure that people within your organisation know what to do if someone contacts them about a data breach, whether it’s covered by statutory regulations (like GDPR) or not. This should include whoever it is answers your main enquiry line or receives messages to generic company email accounts, and not just your IT or legal departments. Educate everybody in the basics, and make sure that those tasked with dealing with issues are as well-trained and ready to respond as the people I encountered.
1 – General Data Protection Regulation, wouldn’t it be more fun if it were something like “Good Dogs Pee Regularly?”
2 – though GDPR does seem to have reduced the amount of spam, I think.
4 – don’t start me.
5 – I’ve changed this information, for reasons which I hope are obvious.
6 – “dum-di-dum-di-dum-di-dum, dum-di-dum-di-da-da”
7 – if you get this, then you either live in the UK (and probably listen to Radio 4), or you’re a serious Anglophile.
8 – hopefully not so uncharted for the designers and builders of the metaphorical roller coaster.
I’m going to exploit you all with an article about kittens and security.
It’s summer, it’s hot, nobody wants to work. What we all want to do is look at pictures of cute kittens and go “ahhh”. So I’m going to exploit you all with an article about kittens and (vaguely about) security. It’s light-hearted, it’s fluffy, and it has a picture of two of our cats at the top of it. What’s not to like?
Warning: this article includes extreme footnoting, and may not be suitable for all readers.
Now, don’t get me wrong: I
like users. realise the importance of users, really I do. They are the reason we have jobs. Unluckily, they’re often the reason we wish we didn’t have the jobs we do. I’m surprised that nobody has previously bothered to compile a list comparing them with kittens[7.5], so I’ve done it for you. For ease of reading, I’ve grouped ways in which users are like kittens towards the top of the table, and ways in which they’re unlike kittens towards the bottom[7.8].
Please enjoy this post, share it inappropriately on social media and feel free to suggest other ways in which kittens and users are similar or dissimilar.
Hastily compiled table
|Capable of circumventing elaborate security measures
|Take up all of your time||Yes||Yes|
|Do things they’re not supposed to
|Forget all training instantly
|Damage sensitive equipment||Yes||Yes|
|Can often be found on Facebook
|Constantly need cleaning up after
|Often seem quite stupid, but are capable of extreme cunning at inopportune moments||Yes||Yes|
|Can turn savage for no obvious reason||Yes||Yes|
|Can be difficult to tell apart||Yes||Yes|
|Fall asleep a lot||No||Yes|
|Wake you up at night||No||Yes|
|Like to have their tummy tickled
|Generally fun to be around||No||Yes|
1 – at time of writing, in the Northern Hemisphere, where I’m currently located. Apologies to all those readers for whom it is not summer.
2 – see 1.
3 – actually, I don’t think this needs a disclaimer.
4 – sorry for wasting your time.
5 – for younger readers, “kittehs”.
6 – like the kittens.
7 – particularly those who object to footnotes. You know who you are.
7.5 – actually, they may well have done, but I couldn’t be bothered to look[7.7]
7.7 – yes, I wrote the rest of the article first and then realised that I needed another footnote (now two), but couldn’t be bothered to renumber them all. I’m lazy.
7.8 – you’re welcome[7.9].
7.9 – you know, this reminds me of programming BASIC in the old days, when it wasn’t easy to renumber your program, and you’d start out numbering in 10s, and then fill in the blanks and hope you didn’t need too many extra lines[7.95].
7.95 – b*gger.
8 – with some exceptions.
9 – unless you’re on support duty. Then you can be pretty sure that they will.
10 – see picture.
11 – unused.
12 – intentionally left blank.
13 – unintentionally left blank.
What’s the difference between mitigate and remediate?
I very, very nearly titled this article “The ‘aters gonna ‘ate”, and then thought better of it. This is a rare event, and I put it down to the extreme temperatures that we’re having here in the UK at the moment.
What prompted this article was reading something online today where I saw the word mitigate, and thought to myself, “When did I start using that word? It’s not a normal one to drop into conversation. And what about remediate? What’s the difference between mitigate and remediate? In fact, how well could I describe the difference between the two?” Both are quite jargon-y word, so, in the spirit of my recent article Jargon – a force for good or ill? here’s my attempt at describing the difference, but also pointing out how important both are – along with a couple of other “-ate” words.
Let’s work backwards.
Remediation is a set of actions to get things back the way they should be. It’s the last step in the process of recovery from an attack or other failure. The re– prefix here is the give -away: like resetting and reconciliation. When you’re remediating, there may be an expectation that you’ll be returning your systems to the same state they were before, for example, power failure, but that’s not necessarily the case. What you should be focussing on is the service you’re providing, rather than the system(s) that are providing it. A set of steps for remediation might require you to replace your database with another one from a completely different provider, to add a load-balancer and to change all of your hardware, but you’re still remediating the problem that hit you. At the very least, if you’ve suffered an attack, you should make sure that you plug any hole that allowed the attacker in to start with.
Mitigation isn’t about making things better – it’s about reducing the impact of an attack or failure. Mitigation is the first set of steps you take when you realise that you’ve got a problem. You could argue that these things are connected, but mitigation isn’t about returning the service to normal (remediation), but about taking steps to reduce the impact of an attack. Those mitigations may be external – adding load-balancers to help deal with a DDoS attack, maybe – or internal – shutting down systems that have been actively compromised.
In fact, I’d argue that some mitigations might quite properly actually have an adverse effect on the service: there may be short term reductions in availability to ensure that long-term remediations can be performed. Planning for this is vitally important, as I’ve discussed previously, in Service degradation: actually a good thing.
The other -ates: update and operate
As I promised above, there are a couple of other words that are part of your response to an attack – or possible attack. The first is update. Updating is one of the key measures that you can put in place to reduce the chance of a successful attack. It’s the step you take before mitigation – because, if you’re lucky, you won’t need mitigation, because you’ll be immune from attack.
The second of these is operate. Operation is your normal state: it’s where you want to be. But operation doesn’t mean that you can just sit back and feel secure: you need to be keeping an eye on what’s going on, planning upgrades, considering mitigations and preparing for remediations. We too often think of the operate step as our Happy Place, where all is rosy, and we can sit back and watch the daisies grow. As DevOps (and DevSecOps) is teaching us, this is absolutely not the case: operate is very much a dynamic state, and not a passive one.
1 – 30C (~86F) is hot for the UK. Oh, and most houses (ours included) don’t have air conditioning.
2 – and I work from an office in the garden. Direct sunlight through the mainly glass wall is a blessing in the winter. Less so in the summer.
3 – hopefully open source, of course.
4 – hint: patch, patch, patch.
5 – well, that attack, at least. You’re never immune from all attacks: sorry.
Our security logs define our organisational memory.
Imagine, just imagine, that you’re head of an organisation, and you suspect that there’s been some sort of attack on your systems. You don’t know for sure, but a bunch of your cleverest folks are pretty sure that there are sufficient signs to merit an investigation. So, you agree to allow that investigation, and it’s pretty clear from the outset – and becomes yet more clear as the investigation unfolds – that there was an attack on your organisation. And as this investigation draws close to its completion, you happen to meet the head of another organisation, which happens to be not only your competitor, but also the party that your investigators are certain was behind the attack. That person – the leader of your competitor – tells you that they absolutely didn’t perform an attack: no, sirree. Who do you believe? Your people, who have been laboring away for months, or your competitor?
What a ridiculous question: of course you’d believe your own people over your competitor, right?
So, having set up such an absurd scenario, let’s look at a scenario which is actually much more likely. Your systems have been acting strangely, and there seems to be something going on. Based on the available information, you believe that you’ve been attacked, but you’re not sure. Your experts think it’s pretty likely, so you approve an investigation. And then one of your investigatory team come to you to tell you some really bad news about the data. “What’s the problem?” you ask. “Is there no data?”
“No,” they reply, “it’s worse than that. We’ve got loads of data, but we don’t know which is real.”
Our logs are our memory
There is a literary trope – one of my favourite examples is Margery Allingham’s The Traitor’s Purse – where a character realises that he or she is somebody other than who they think they are when they start to question their memories. We are defined by our memories, and the same goes for organisational security. Our security logs define our organisational memory. If you cannot prove that the data you are looking at is correct, then you cannot be sure what led to the state you are in now.
Let’s give a quick example. In my organisation, I am careful to log every time I upgrade a piece of software, but I begin to wonder whether a particular application is behaving as expected. Maybe I see some traffic to an external IP address which I’ve never seen before, for instance. Well, the first thing I’m going to do is to check the logs to see whether somebody has updated the software with a malicious version. Assuming that somebody has installed a malicious version, there are three likely outcomes at this point:
- you check the logs, and it’s clear that a non-authorised version was installed. This isn’t good, because you now know that somebody has unauthorised access to your system, but at least you can do something about it.
- at least some of the logs are missing. This is less good, because you really can’t be sure what’s gone on, but you know have a pretty strong suspicion that somebody with unauthorised access has deleted some logs to cover up their tracks, which means that you have a starting point for remediation.
- there’s nothing wrong. All the logs look fine. You’re now really concerned, as you can’t be sure of your own data – your organisation’s memories. You may be looking at correct data, or you may be looking at incorrect data: data which has been written by your enemy. Attackers can – and do – go into log files and change the data in them to obscure the fact that they have performed particular actions. It’s actually one of the first steps that a competent attacker will perform.
In the scenario as defined, things probably aren’t too bad: you can check the checksum or hash of the installed software, and check that it’s the version you expect. But what if the attacker has also changed the version of your checksum- or hash-checker so that, for packages associated with this particular application, they always return what you expect to see? This is not a theoretical attack, and nor is it the only way approach that attackers have to try to muddy the waters as to what they’ve done. And if it has happened, they you have no way of confirming that you have the correct version of the application. You can try updating the checksum- or hash-checker, but what if the attacker has meddled with the software installer to ensure that it always installs their version…?
It’s a slippery slope, and bar wiping the entire system and reinstalling, there’s little you can do to be certain that you’ve cleared things up properly. And in some cases, it may be too late: what if the attacker’s main aim was to exfiltrate some of your proprietary data, for example?
Lessons to learn, actions to take
Well, the key lesson is that your logs are important, and they need to be protected. If you can’t trust your logs, then it can be very, very difficult not only to identify the extent of an attack, but also to remediate it or, in the worst case, even to know that you’ve been attacked at all.
And what can you do? Well, there are many techniques that you can employ, and the best combination will depend on a number of questions, including your regulatory regime, your security posture, and what attackers you decide to defend against. I’d start with a fairly simple combination:
- move your most important logs off-system. Where possible, host logs on different systems to the ones that are doing the reporting. If you’re an attacker, it’s more difficult to jump from one system to another than it is to make changes to logs on a system which you’ve already compromised;
- make your logs write-only. This sounds crazy – how are you supposed to check logs if they can’t be read? What this really means is that you separate read and write privileges on your logs so that only those with a need to read them can do so. Writing is less worrisome – though there are attacks here, including filesystem starvation – because if you can’t see what you need to change, then it’s almost impossible to do so. If you’re an attacker, you might be able to wipe some logs – see our case 2 above – but obscuring what you’ve actually done is more difficult.
Exactly what steps you take are up to you, but remember: if you can’t trust your logs, you can’t trust your data, and if you can’t trust your data, you don’t know what has happened. That’s what your enemy wants: confusion.
1 – like that’s ever going to happen.
2- on this, very rare, occasion, I’m going to countenance a US spelling. I think you can guess why.
3 – contenance?
4 – I know, I know.
5 – are?
6 – you checked the firmware, right? Hmm – maybe safer just to buy completely new hardware.
… we’ve got a good chance of doing the right thing, and keeping the auditors happy.
Security policies are something that everybody knows they should have, but which are deceptively simple to get wrong. A set of simple steps to check when you’re implementing them is something that I think it’s important to share. You know when you come up a set of steps, you suddenly realise that you’ve got a couple of vowels in there and you think, “wow, I can make an acronym!”? This was one of those times. The problem was that when I looked at the different steps, I decided that DDEAVMM doesn’t actually have much of a ring to it. I’ve clearly still got work to do before I can name major public sector projects, for instance. However, I still think it’s worth sharing, so let’s go through them in order. Order, as for many sets of steps, is important here.
I’m going to give an example and walk through the steps for clarity. Let’s say that our CISO, in his or her infinite wisdom, has decided that they don’t want anybody outside our network to be able to access our corporate website via port 80. This is the policy that we need to implement.
The first thing I need is a useful definition. We nearly have that from the request noted above, when our CISO said “I don’t want anybody outside our network to be able to access our corporate website via port 80”. So, let’s make that into a slightly more useful definition.
“Access to IP address mycorporate.network.com on port 80 must be blocked to all hosts outside the 10.0.x.x to 10.3.x.x network range.”
I’m assuming that we already know that our main internal network is within 10.0.x.x to 10.3.x.x. It’s not exactly a machine readable definition, but actually, that’s the point: we’re looking for a definition which is clear and human understandable. Let’s assume that we’re happy with this, at least for now.
Next, we need to design a way to implement this. There are lots of ways of doing this – from iptables to a full-blown, commercially supported firewall – and I’m not fluent in any of them these days, so I’m going to assume that somebody who is better equipped than I has created a rule or set of rules to implement the policy defined in step 1.
We also need to define some tests – we’ll come back to these in step 5.
But we need to check. What if they’ve mis-implemented it? What if they misunderstood the design requirement? It’s good practice – in fact, it’s vital – to do some evaluation of the design to ensure it’s correct. For this rather simple example, it should be pretty to check by eye, but we might want to set up a test environment to evaluate that it meets the policy definition or take other steps to evaluate its correctness. And don’t forget: we’re not checking that the design does what the person/team writing it thinks it should do: we’re checking that it meets the definition. It’s quite possible that at this point we’ll realise that the definition was incorrect. Maybe there’s another subnet – 10.5.x.x, for instance – that the security policy designer didn’t know about. Or maybe the initial request wasn’t sufficiently robust, and our CISO actually wanted to block all access on any port other than 443 (for HTTPS), which should be allowed. Now is a very good time to find that out.
We’ve ascertained that the design does what it should do – although we may have iterated a couple of times on exactly “what it should do” means – so now we can implement it. Whether that’s ssh-ing into a system, uploading a script, using some sort of GUI or physically installing a new box, it’s done.
Excellent: we’re finished, right?
No, we’re not. The problem is that often, that’s exactly what people think. Let’s move to our next step: arguably the most important, and the most often forgotten or ignored.
I really care about this one: it’s arguably the point of this post. Once you’ve implemented a security policy, you need to validate that it actually does what it’s supposed to do. I’ve written before about this, in my post If it isn’t tested, it doesn’t work, and it’s absolutely true of security policy implementations. You need to check all of the different parts of the design. This, you might hope, would be really easy, but even in the simple case that we’re working with, there are lots of tests you should be doing. Let’s say that we took the two changes mentioned in step 3. Here are some tests that I would want to be doing, with the expected result:
- FAIL: access port 80 from an external IP address
- FAIL: access port 8080 from an external IP address
- FAIL: access port 80 from a 10.4.x.x address
- PASS: access port 443 from an external IP address
- UNDEFINED: access port 80 from a 10.5.x.x
- UNDEFINED: access port 80 from a 10.0.x.x address
- UNDEFINED: access port 443 from a 10.0.x.x address
- UNDEFINED: access port 80 from an external IP address but with a VPN connection into 10.0.x.x
Of course, we’d want to be performing these tests on a number of other ports, and from a variety of IP addresses, too.
What’s really interesting about the list is the number of expected results that are “UNDEFINED”. Unless we have a specific requirement, we just can’t be sure what’s expected. We can guess, but we can’t be sure. Maybe we don’t care? I particularly like the last one, because the result we get may lead us much deeper into our IT deployment than we might expect.
The point, however, is that we need to check that the actual results meet our expectations, and maybe even define some new requirements if we want to remove some of the “UNDEFINED”. We may be fine to leave some the expected results as “UNDEFINED”, particularly if they’re out of scope for our work or our role. Obviously, if the results don’t meet our expectations, then we also need to make some changes and apply them and then re-validate. We also need to record the final results.
When we’ve got more complex security policy – multiple authentication checks, or complex SDN routing rules – then our tests are likely to be much, much more complex.
We’re still not done. Remember those results we got in our previous tests? Well, we need to monitor our system and see if there’s any change. We should do this on a fairly frequent basis. I’m not going to say “regular”, because regular practices can lead to sloppiness, and also leave windows of opportunities open to attackers. We also need to perform checks whenever we make a change to a connected system. Oh, if I had a dollar for every time I’ve heard “oh, this won’t affect system X at all.”…
One interesting point is that we should also note when results whose expected value remains “UNDEFINED” change. This may be a sign that something in our system has changed, it may be a sign that a legitimate change has been made in a connected system, or it may be a sign of some sort of attack. It may not be quite as important as a change in one of our expected “PASS” or “FAIL” results, but it certainly merits further investigation.
Things will go wrong. Some of them will be our fault, some of them will be our colleagues’ fault, some of them will be accidental, or due to hardware failure, and some will be due to attacks. In all of these cases, we need to act to mitigate the failure. We are in charge of this policy, so even if the failure is out of our control, we want to make sure that mitigating mechanism are within our control. And once we’ve completed the mitigation, we’re going to have to go back at least to step 2 and redesign our implementation. We might even need to go back to step 1 and redefine what our definition should be.
There are many other points to consider, and one of the most important is the question of responsibility, touched on in step 7 (and which is particularly important during holiday seasons), special circumstances and decommissioning, but if we can keep these steps in mind when we’re implementing – and running – security policies, we’ve got a good chance of doing the right thing, and keeping the auditors happy, which is always worthwhile.
1 – I’m really sure it’s not just me. Ask your colleagues.
2 – although, back when Father Ted was on TV, a colleague of mine and I came up with a database result which we named a “Fully Evaluated Query”. It made us happy, at least.
3 – if it’s from the CISO, and he/she is my boss, then it’s not a request, it’s an order, but you get the point.
4 – which would be my first port of call, but might not be the appropriate approach in this context.
5 – sorry, that was unintentional.
6 – just because it’s commercially support doesn’t mean it has to be proprietary: open source is your friend, boys and girls, ladies and gentlemen.
7 – Software-Defined Networking.
8 – I’m going to leave you hanging, other than to say that, at current exchange rates, and assuming it was US dollars I was collecting, then I’d have almost exactly 3/4 of that amount in British pounds.
9 – other currencies are available, but please note that I’m not currently accepting bitcoin.
10 – one of the best types.
If I were going to launch a cyberattack on the US, I would do it on the 4th July.
There’s a piece of received wisdom from the years of the Cold War that if the Russians had ever really wanted to start a land war in Europe, they would have done it on Christmas Day, when all of the US soldiers in Germany were partying and therefore unprepared for an attack. I’m not sure if this is actually fair – I’m sure that US commanders had considered this eventuality – but it makes for a good story.
If I were going to launch a cyberattack on the US, I would do it on the 4thof July. Now, to be entirely clear, I have no intentions of performing any type of attack – cyber or not – on our great ally across the Pond: not today (which is actually the 3rd July) or tomorrow. Quite apart from anything else, I’m employed by a US company, and I also need to travel to the US on business quite frequently. I’d prefer to be able to continue both these activities without undue attention from the relevant security services.
The point, however, is that the 4th of July would be a good time to do it. How do I know this? I know it because it’s one of my favourite holidays. This may sound strange to those of you who follow or regularly read this blog, who will know – from my spelling, grammar and occasional snide humour – that I’m a Brit, live in the UK, and am proud of my Britishness. The 4th of July is widely held, by residents and citizens of the USA, to be a US holiday, and, specifically, one where they get to cock a snook at the British. But I know, and my European colleagues know – in fact, I suspect that the rest of the world outside the US knows – that if you are employed by, are partners of, or otherwise do business with the US, then the 4th of July is a holiday for you as well.
It’s the day when you don’t get emails. Or phone calls. There are no meetings arranged.
It’s the day when you can get some work done. Sounds a bit odd for a holiday, but that’s what most of us do.
Now, I’m sure that, like the US military in the Cold War, some planning has taken place, and there is a phalanx of poor, benighted sysadmins ready to ssh into servers around the US in order to deal with any attacks that come in and battle with the unseen invaders. But I wonder if there are enough of them, and I wonder whether the senior sysadmins, the really experienced ones who are most likely to be able to repulse the enemy, haven’t ensured that it’s their junior colleagues who are the ones on duty so that they – the senior ones – can get down to some serious barbecuing and craft beer consumption. And I wonder what the chances are of getting hold of the CISO or CTO when urgent action is required.
I may be being harsh here: maybe everything’s completely under control across all organisations throughout the USA, and nobody will take an extra day or two of holiday this week. In fact, I suspect that many sensible global organisations – even those based in the US – have ensured that they’ve readied Canadian, Latin American, Asian or European colleagues to deal with any urgent issues that come up. I really, really hope so. For now, though, I’m going to keep my head down and hope that the servers I need to get all that work done on my favourite holiday stay up and responsive.
Oh, and roll on Thanksgiving.
1 – I suppose it should really be “the Soviet Union”, but it was also “the Russians”: go figure.
2 – the Atlantic ocean – this is British litotes.
3 – which is, like, a million times better than hyperbole.
4 – look them up.
5 – saying “I work for” sets such a dangerous precendent, don’t you think?
6 – litotes again.
7 – the probably don’t cock a snook, actually, as that’s quite a British phrase.
8 – I’m assuming UNIX or Linux sysadmins: therefore most likely bearded, and most likely craft beer drinkers. Your stereotypes may vary.