Top 7 tips to improve your conference presentation

It’s all about the slides and their delivery.

Well, it’s conference season again. I’ll be off to the West Coast for DeveloperWeek, then RSA, and, I’m sure, more conferences through the coming months. I had a good old rant a few months ago about what I hate about conference speakers, so this seems like a good opportunity to talk about all the good things that I actually enjoy. Well, it might to you, but I’ve got all sorts of spleen-venting that I still want to do, so bad luck: you’re getting another rant.  This time round, rather than getting all shouty about product pitching (which was the subject of my last cross-fest[1]), this time it’s all about the slides and their delivery.

First, here’s a disclaimer, however, or maybe two. One is this: I’m not perfect[3]. I’m may well have been guilty of one or many of the points below in many or all of my presentations. If I have, I’m sorry: and I’d like to know about it, as I like to fix things.

The other is this: not everyone is excellent, or will ever be excellent, at presenting. However hard you try, it may be that it’s never going to be your top skill. That’s fine. On the other hand, if you’re not great at spelling, or you tend to zone out your audience, and you know it – in fact, if you struggle with any of the points below – then ask for help. It doesn’t need to be professional help – ask a colleague or family member, or even a friendly member of the conference staff – but ask for suggestions, and apply them.

Before we delve deeper into this topic, why is it important?  Well, people (generally) go to conferences to learn – maybe to be entertained, as well.  Most conferences require attendees or their organisations to pay, and even if they don’t, there’s an investment of time.  You owe it to the attendees to give them the best value that you can, and ignoring opportunities to improve is arrogant, rude and disrespectful.  You may not feel that bad spelling, punctuation or layout, or even poor delivery, will detract from their experience, but they all distract from the message, and can negatively impact on what people are trying to learn.  They are also unprofessional, and here’s another important point to remember about conference speaking: it’s an opportunity to showcase your expertise, or at least get other people to be enthusiastic about the things you do. If you don’t do the best you can do, you are selling yourself short, and that’s never a good thing.

Here, then, are my top seven tips to improve your conference presentations.  I’m assuming, for the purposes of this article, that you’re presenting a slidedeck at an industry presentation, though many of these points are more broadly applicable.

Layout

I’m not just talking colours and shapes, but also how much is on your slides, whether it’s in sentence or bullet format, and the rest.  Because how your slides look matters.  Not just because of your company’s or organisation’s brand, but because it directly affects how people process the information on your slides.  The appropriate amount – and type – of information to put on a slide varies based on subject, technical depth, audience, for instance, but a good rule to remember is that people will generally read the slides before they listen to you.  If you have more than about 20-30 words on a slide, realise that nobody’s going to hear a word you say until they’ve finished reading, and that’s going to take an appreciable amount of time.  If in doubt, have multiple bullets, and reveal them as you talk (and never just read what’s on the slides: what’s the point of that?).

Spelling, punctuation and grammar

You may not care about spelling, but lots of people do.  It can be distracting to many people to see bad spelling, punctuation or grammar on your slides.  Everybody makes mistakes – and that’s why it’s worth reviewing your slides and maybe getting somebody else to have a look, too.  The amount that this matters will depend on your audience – but correcting slips raises the credibility of the presentation as a whole, because mistakes reflect badly on you, whether you like it or not.

Pictures

Or graphs.  Or diagrams.  I don’t care: put something in there to break up the slides.  I’m really guilty of this: I tend to have slide after slide of text, and forget that many people will just glaze over after the first few.  So I try to find a few pictures, or, even better, relevant diagrams, and put them in.  There are lots of free-to-use pictures available (search for “creative commons” online), and make sure that you provide the correct attribution when you use them.

Style

People have different styles, and that’s fine.  Mine tends towards the jokey and possibly slightly over-enthusiastic, so I need to think about how I pitch different types of information from time to time.  Play to your strengths, but be aware of the situation.  People will remember you if you’re a bit different, and there are times for humorous t-shirts, but there are times for a jacket or tie and a more sombre approach, too.

Tone

Do. Not. Drone.  There’s just nothing worse, particularly when the presenter is just reading the information on the slides.  And after a long lunch[4], it’s so easy to nod off, or just start looking at stuff on your phone or laptop.   If you think you might suffer from a boring tone, ask people for help: practice delivering to them, and then think about how you speak.  It’s relatively easy for most people to learn to modulate their tone a little up and down with practice, and it can make all the difference.  Equally, learning when to stop to allow people to digest the information on a slide can give you – and them – a break: a change is, as they say, as good as a rest.

Delivery

I’ve already said that you mustn’t just read the words on the slides.  I’ll say it again: don’t just read the words on the slides.  Notes are fine – in fact, they’re great, as most people aren’t good at improvising – or you can learn a script, but either way, one of the most important lessons when delivering any type of information is to look at your audience.  Sometimes this is difficult – there may be little light to see them by, or you may find it nerve-wracking actually to look at your audience – so here’s a trick: pretend to look at your audience.  Choose a spot just a few centimetres[5] above where an audience member is – or might be, if you can’t see them – and speak to that.  They’ll think you’re speaking to them.  Next slide, or next bullet, move your head a little, and choose another spot.  Engaging with your audience is vital – and will actually make it easier to manage issues like tone.

Audience

This could have gone first, or could have gone last, but it’s really important.  Think about your audience.  If it’s a conference for techies, don’t use marketing diagrams.  If it’s for CEOs, don’t go into the weeds about compiler design.  If it’s for marketing folks, well, anything goes, as long as there are pictures[6].  Remember – these people have invested their time (and possibly money) in coming to see you to learn information which is relevant to them and their jobs, and you owe it to them to pitch the right sort of information, at the right level.

Summary

I really enjoy conference speaking, but I know that this isn’t true of everybody.  I often enjoy attendee conference sessions, but poor attention to any of the points above can detract from my enjoyment, the amount I learn, and how I feel about the topic and the speaker.  It’s always worth trying to improve: watch TED-talks, take notes on what your favourite speakers do, and practice.


1 – I’m pathetically amused that my spollcheeker[2] wanted that word to be “cross-stitch”.

2 – yes, it was intentional.

3 – just ask my wife.

4 – or during the first session after the conference party the night before – a terrible slot to land.

5 – or slightly fewer inches.

6 – this is mean and unfair to my marketing colleagues.  I apologise.  A bit.

Equality in volunteering and open source

Volunteering favours the socially privileged

Volunteering is “in”. Lots of companies – particularly tech companies, it seems – provide incentives to employees to volunteer for charities, NGOs abs other “not-for-profits”. These incentives range from donations matching to paid volunteer days to matching hours worked for a charity with a cash donation.

Then there’s other types of voluntary work: helping out at a local sports club, mowing a neighbour’s lawn or fetching their groceries, and, of course, a open source, which we’ll be looking at in some detail. There are almost countless thousands of projects which could benefit from your time.

Let’s step back first and look at the benefits of volunteering. The most obvious, if course, is the direct benefit to the organisation, group or individual of your time and/or expertise. Then there’s the benefits to the wider community. Having people volunteering their time to help out with various groups – particularly those with whom they would have little contact in other circumstances – helps social cohesion and encourages better understanding of differing points of view as you meet people, and not just opinions.

Then there’s the benefit to you. Helping others feels great, looks good on your CV[1], can give you more skills, and make you friends – quite apart from the benefit I mentioned above about helping you to understand differing points of view. On the issue of open source, it’s something that lots of companies – certainly the sorts of companies with which I’m generally involved – are interested in, or even expect to see on your CV. Your contributions to open source projects are visible – unlike whatever you’ve been doing in most other jobs – they can be looked over, they show a commitment and are also a way of gauging your enthusiasm, expertise and knowledge in particular areas. All this seems to make lots of sense, and until fairly recently, I was concerned when I was confronted with a CV which didn’t have any open source contributions that I could check.

The inequality of volunteering

And then I did some reading by a feminist open sourcer (I’m afraid that I can’t remember who it was[3]), and did a little more digging, and realised that it’s far from that simple. Volunteering is an activity which favours the socially privileged – whether that’s in terms of income, gender, language or any other number of indicator. That’s particularly true for software and open source volunteering.

Let me explain. We’ll start with the gender issue. On average, you’re much less likely to have spare time to be involved in an open source project if you’re a woman, because women, on average, have more responsibilities in the home, and less free time. They are also globally less likely to have access to computing resources with which to contribute. due to wage discrepancies. Even beyond that, they are less likely to be welcomed into communities and have their contributions valued, whilst being more likely to attract abuse.

If you are in a low income bracket, you are less likely to have time to volunteer, and again, to have access to the resources needed to contribute.

If your first language is not English, you are less likely to be able to find an accepting project, and more likely to receive abuse for not explaining what you are doing.

If your name reflects a particular ethnicity, you may not be made to feel welcome in some contexts online.

If you are not neurotypical (e.g. you have Aspergers or are on the autism spectrum, or if you are dyslexic), you may face problems in engaging in the social activities – online and offline – which are important to full participation in many projects.

The list goes on. There are, of course, many welcoming project and communities that attempt to address all of these issues, and we must encourage that. Some people who are disadvantaged in terms of some of the privilege-types that I’ve noted above may actually find that open source suits them very well, as their privilege can be hidden online in ways in which it could not be in other settings, and that some communities make a special effort to be welcoming and accepting.

However, if we just assume – that’s unconscious bias, folks – that volunteering, and specifically open source volunteering, is a sine qua non for “serious” candidates for roles, or a foundational required expertise for someone we are looking to employ, then we set a dangerous precedent, and run a very real danger of reinforcing privilege, rather than reducing it.

What can we do?

First, we can make our open source projects more welcoming, and be aware of the problems that those from less privileged groups may face. Second, we must be aware, and make our colleagues aware, that when we are interviewing and hiring, lack evidence of volunteering is not evidence that the person is not talented, enthusiastic or skilled. Third, and always, we should look for more ways to help those who are less privileged than us to overcome the barriers to accessing not only jobs but also volunteering opportunities which will benefit not only them, but our communities as a whole.


1 – Curriculum vitae[2].

2 – Oh, you wanted the Americanism? It’s “resume” or something similar, but with more accents on it.

3 – a friend reminded me that it might have been this: https://www.ashedryden.com/blog/the-ethics-of-unpaid-labor-and-the-oss-community

Thinking beyond “zero-trust”

The components in which you have constant trust relationships are “islands in the stream”.

I wrote a fairly complex post a few months ago called “Zero-trust”: my love/hate relationship, in which I discussed in some details what “zero-trust” networks are, and why I’m not convinced.  The key point turned out to be that I’m not happy about the way the word “zero” is being thrown around here, as I think what’s really going on is explicit trust.

Since then, there hasn’t been a widespread movement away from using the term, to my vast lack of surprise.  In fact, I’ve noticed the term “zero-trust” being used in a different context: in p2p (peer-to-peer) and Web 3.0 discussions.  The idea is that there are some components of the ecosystem that we don’t need to trust: they’re “just there”, doing what they were designed to do, and are basically neutral in terms of the rest of the actors in the network.  Now, I like the idea that there are neutral components in the ecosystem: I think it’s a really important distinction to make to other parts of the system.  What I’m not happy about is the suggestion that we have zero trust in those components.  For me, these are the components that we must trust the most of all of the entities in the system.  If they don’t do what we expect them to do, then everything falls apart pretty quickly.  I think the same argument probably applies to “zero-trust” networking, too.

I started thinking quite hard about this, and I think I understand where the confusion arises.  I’ve spent a lot of time over nearly twenty years thinking about trust, and what it means.  I described my definition of trust in another post, “What is trust?” (which goes into quite a lot of detail, and may be worth reading for a deeper understanding of what I’m going on about here):

  • “Trust is the assurance that one entity holds that another will perform particular actions according to a specific expectation.”

For the purposes of this discussion, it’s the words “will perform particular actions according to a specific expectation” that are key here.  This sounds to me as exactly what is being described in the requirement above that components are “doing what they’re designed to do”.  It is this trust in their correct functioning which is a key foundation in the systems being described.  As someone with a background in security, I always (try to) have these sorts of properties in mind when I consider a system: they are, as above, typically foundational.

What I think most people are interested in, however – because it’s a visible and core property of many p2p systems – is the building, maintaining and decay of trust between components.  In this equation, the components have zero change in trust unless there’s a failure in the system (which, being a non-standard state, is not a property that is top-of-mind).  If you’re interested in a p2p world where you need constantly to be evaluating and re-evaluating the level of trust you have in other actors, then the components in which you have (hopefully) constant trust relationships are “islands in the stream”.  If they can truly be considered neutral in terms of their trust – they are neither able to be considered “friendly” nor “malevolent” as they are neither allied to nor can be suborned by any of the actors – then their static nature is uninteresting in terms of the standard operation of the system which you are building.

This does not mean that they are uninteresting or unimportant, however.  Their correct creation and maintenance are vital to the system itself.  It’s for this reason that I’m unhappy about the phrase “zero-trust”, as it seems to suggest that these components are not worthy of our attention.  As a security bod, I reckon they’re among the most fascinating parts of any system (partly because, if I were a Bad Person[tm], they would be my first point of attack).  So you can be sure that I’m going to be keeping an eye out for these sorts of components, and trying to raise people’s awareness of their importance.  You can trust me.

Cryptographers arise!

Cryptography is a strange field, in that it’s both concerned with keeping secrets, but also has a long history of being kept secret, as well.  There are famous names from the early days, from Caesar (Julius, that is) to Vigenère, to more recent names like Diffie, Hellman[1], Rivest, Shamir and Adleman.  The trend even more recently has been away from naming cryptographic protocols after their creators, and more to snappy names like Blowfish or less snappy descriptions such as “ECC”.  Although I’m not generally a fan of glorifying individual talent over collective work, this feels like a bit of a pity in some ways.

In fact, over the past 80 years or so, more effort has been probably put into keeping the work of teams in cryptanalysis – the study of breaking cryptography – secret, though there are some famous names from the past like Al-Kindi, Phelippes (or “Phillips), Rejewski, Turing, Tiltman, Knox and Briggs[2].

Cryptography is difficult.  Actually, let me rephrase that: cryptography is easy to do badly, and difficult to do well.  “Anybody can design a cipher that they can’t break”, goes an old dictum, with the second half of the sentence, “and somebody else can easily break”, being generally left unsaid.  Creation of cryptographic primitives requires significant of knowledge of mathematics – some branches of which are well within the grasp of an average high-school student, and some of which are considerably more arcane.  Putting those primitives together in ways that allow you to create interesting protocols for use in the real world doesn’t necessarily require that you understand the full depth of the mathematics of the primitives that you’re using[3], but does require a good grounding in how they should be used, and how they should not be used.  Even then, a wise protocol designer, like a wise cryptographer[4], always gets colleagues and others to review his or her work.  This is one of the reasons that it’s so important that cryptography should be in the public domain, and preferably fully open source.

Why am I writing about this?  Well, partly because I think that, on the whole, the work of cryptographers is undervalued.  The work they do is not only very tricky, but also vital.  We need cryptographers and cryptanalysts to be working in the public realm, designing new algorithms and breaking old (and, I suppose) new ones.  We should be recognising and celebrating their work.  Mathematics is not standing still, and, as I wrote recently, quantum computing is threatening to chip away at our privacy and secrecy.  The other reasons that I’m writing about this is because I think we should be proud of our history and heritage, inspired to work on important problems, and to inspire those around us to work on them, too.

Oh, and if you’re interested in the t-shirt, drop me a line or put something in the comments.


1 – I’m good at spelling, really I am, but I need to check the number of ells and ens in his name every single time.

2 – I know that is heavily Bletchley-centric: it’s an area of history in which I’m particularly interested.  Bletchley was also an important training ground for some very important women in security – something of which we have maybe lost sight.

3 – good thing, too, as I’m not a mathematician, but I have designed the odd protocol here and there.

4 – that is, any cryptographer who recognises the truth of the dictum I quote above.

The “invisible” trade-off? Security.

“For twenty years, people have been leaving security till last.”

Colleague (in a meeting): “For twenty years, people have been leaving security till last.”

Me (in response): “You could have left out those last two words.”

This article will be a short one, and it’s a plea.  It’s also not aimed at my regular readership, because if you’re part of my regular readership, then you don’t need telling.  Many of the articles on this blog, however, are written with the express intention of meeting two criteria:

  1. they should be technical credible[1].
  2. you should be able to show them to your parents or to your manager[2].

I suspect that it’s your manager, this time round, who I’ll be targeting, but I don’t want to make assumptions about your parents’ roles or influence, so let’s leave it open.

The issue I want to address this week is the impact of not placing security firmly at the beginning, middle and end of any system or application design process.  As we all know, security isn’t something that you can bolt onto the end of a project and hope that you’ll be OK.  Equally, if you think about it only at the beginning, you’ll find that by the end, your requirements, use cases, infrastructure or personae will have changed[3], and what you planned at the beginning is no longer fit for purpose.  After all, if you know that your functional requirements will change (and everybody knows this), then why would your non-functional requirements be subject to the same drift?

The problem is that security, being a non-functional requirement[4], doesn’t get the up-front visibility that it needs.  And, because it’s difficult to do well, and it’s often the responsibility of a non-core team member “flown in” as a consultant or expert for a small percentage design meetings, security is the area that it’s easy to decide to let slide a bit.  Or a lot.  Or completely.

If there’s a trade-off around features, functionality or resource location, it’s likely to be security, and often, nobody even raises the point that there has been a trade-off: it’s completely invisible (this is one of the reasons Why I love technical debt).  This is also the reason that whenever I look at a system, I try to think “what were the decisions made about security?”, because, too often, no decisions were made about security at all.

So, if you’re a manager[6], and you’re involved with designing a system or application, don’t let security be the invisible trade-off.  I’m not saying that it needs to be the be-all and end-all of the project, but at least ensure that you think about it.  Thank you.


1 – they should be accurate, to be honest, but I also try not to dive deeper into technical topics than is absolutely required for context.

2 – to be clear, this isn’t about making them work- and parent-safe, but about presenting the topics in a manner that is approachable by non-experts.

3 – or, equally likely, all of them.

4 – I don’t mean that security doesn’t function correctly[5], but rather that it’s not one of the key functions of the system or application that’s being designed.

5 – though, now you mention it…

6 – or parent – see above.

Will quantum computing break security?

Do you want J. Random Hacker to be able to pretend that they’re your bank?

Over the past few years, a new type of computer has arrived on the block: the quantum computer.  It’s arguably the sixth type of computer:

  1. humans – before there were artificial computers, people used, well, people.  And people with this job were called “computers”.
  2. mechanical analogue – devices such as the Antikythera mechanism, astrolabes or slide rules.
  3. mechanical digital – in this category I’d count anything that allowed discrete mathematics, but didn’t use electronics for the actual calculation: the abacus, Babbage’s Difference Engine, etc.
  4. electronic analogue – many of these were invented for military uses such as bomb sights, gun aiming, etc.
  5. electronic digital – I’m going to go out on a limb here, and characterise Colossus as the first electronic digital computer[1]: these are basically what we use today for anything from mobile phones to supercomputers.
  6. quantum computers – these are coming, and are fundamentally different to all of the previous generations.

What is quantum computing?

Quantum computing uses concepts from quantum mechanics to allow very different types of calculations to what we’re used to in “classical computing”.  I’m not even going to try to explain, because I know that I’d do a terrible job, so I suggest you try something like Wikipedia’s definition as a starting point.  What’s important for our purposes is to understand that quantum computers use qubits to do calculations, and for quite a few types of mathematical algorithms – and therefore computing operations – they can solve problems much faster than classical computers.

What’s “much faster”?  Much, much faster: orders of magnitude faster.  A calculation that might take years or decades with a classical computer could, in certain circumstances, take seconds.  Impressive, yes?  And scary.  Because one of the types of problems that quantum computers should be good at solving is decrypting encrypted messages, even without the keys.

This means that someone with a sufficiently powerful quantum computer should be able to read all of your current and past messages, decrypt any stored data, and maybe fake digital signatures.  Is this a big thing?  Yes.  Do you want J. Random Hacker to be able to pretend that they’re your bank[2]?  Do you want that transaction on the blockchain where you were sold a 10 bedroom mansion in Mayfair to be “corrected” to be a bedsit in Weston-super-Mare[3]?

Some good news

This is all scary stuff, but there’s good news, of various types.

The first is that in order to make any of this work at all, you need a quantum computer with a good number of qubits operating, and this is turning out to be hard[4].  The general consensus is that we’ve got a few years before anybody has a “big” enough quantum computer to do serious damage to classical encryption algorithms.

The second is that, even with a sufficient number of qubits to attacks our existing algorithms, you still need even more in order to allow for error correction.

The third is that although there are theoretical models to show how to attack some of our existing algorithms, actually making them work is significantly harder than you or I[5] might expect.  In fact, some of the attacks may turn out to be infeasible, or just take more years to perfect that we’d worried about.

The fourth is that there are clever people out there who are designing quantum-computation resistant algorithms (sometimes referred to as “post-quantum algorithms”) that we can use, at least for new encryption, once they’ve been tested and become widely available.

All-in-all, in fact, there’s a strong body of expert opinion that says that we shouldn’t be overly worried about quantum computing breaking our encryption in the next 5 or even 10 years.

And some bad news

It’s not all rosy, however.  Two issues stick out to me as areas of concern.

  1. People are still designing and rolling out systems which don’t consider the issue.  If you’re coming up with a system which is likely to be in use for ten or more years, or which will be encrypting or signing data which must remain confidential or attributable over those sorts of periods, then you should be considering what the possible impact of quantum computing may have on your system.
  2. some of the new, quantum-computing resistant algorithms are proprietary.  This means that when you and I want to start implementing systems which are designed to be quantum-computing resistant, we’ll have to pay to do so.  I’m a big proponent of open source, and particularly of open source cryptography, and my big worry is that we just won’t be able to open source these things, and worse, that when new protocol standards are created – either de facto or through standards bodies – they will choose proprietary algorithms that exclude the use of open source, whether on purpose, through ignorance, or because few good alternatives are available.

What to do?

Luckily, there are things you can do to address both of the issues above.  The first is to think and plan, when designing a system, about what the impact of quantum computing might be on it.  Often – very often – you won’t actually need to implement anything explicit now (and it could be hard to, given the current state of the art), but you should at least embrace the concept of crypto-agility: designing protocols and systems so that you can swap out algorithms if required[7].

The second is a call to arms: get involved in the open source movement, and encourage everybody you know who has anything to do with cryptography to rally for open standards and for research into non-proprietary, quantum-computing resistant algorithms.  This is something that’s very much on my to-do list, and an area where pressure and lobbying is just as important as the research itself.


1 – I think it’s fair to call it the first electronic, programmable computer.  I know there were earlier non-programmable ones, and that some claim ENIAC, but I don’t have the space or the energy to argue the case here.

2 – no.

3 – see [2].  Don’t get me wrong, by the way – I grew up near Weston-super-Mare, and it’s got things going for it, but it’s not Mayfair.

4 – and if a quantum physicist says that something’s hard, then, to my mind, it’s hard.

5 – and I’m assuming that neither of us is a quantum physicist or mathematician[6].

6 – I’m definitely not.

7 – and not just for quantum-computing reasons: there’s a good chance that some of our existing classical algorithms may just fall to other, non-quantum attacks such as new mathematical approaches.