I got phished this week: what did I do?

I was a foolish – but was saved by my forward planning.

The first thing I did was not panic.  The second was to move quickly.

But what happened to get to this stage, you may ask, and how could I have been so stupid?  I’ll tell you the story.

Every day, like most people, I suspect, I get lots of emails[1].  I have a variety of email accounts, and although I’m sure that I should be more disciplined, I tend to just manage them as they come in.  First thing in the morning, though, I tend to sit down with a cup of tea and go through what’s come in an manage what I can then.  Most work emails that require more than a glance and a deletion[2] will wait until later in the day, but I like to deal with any home-related ones before breakfast.

The particular email I’m talking about came in overnight, and I was sitting down with my cup of tea[3] when I noticed an email from a company with whom I have a subscription.  The formatting was what I’d expect, and it looked fine.  It was asking me to change my payment details.

“Danger!” is what you’ll be thinking, and quite rightly.  However, I had some reasons for thinking that I might need to do this.  I’ve recently changed credit cards, and I was aware that there was quite a high likelihood that I’d used the old credit card to subscribe.  What’s more, I had a hazy recollection that I’d first subscribed to this service about this time of year, so it might well be due for renewal.

Here’s where I got even more unlucky: I told myself I’d come back to it because I didn’t have my wallet with me (not having got dressed yet).  This meant that I’d given myself a mental task to deal with the issue later in the day, and I think that this gave it a legitimacy in my head which it wouldn’t have got if I’d looked at it in the first place.  I also mentioned to my wife that I needed to do this: another step which in my head gave the task more legitimacy.

So I filed the mail as “Unread”, and went off to have a proper breakfast.  When I was dressed, I sat down and went back to the email.  I clicked on the link to update, and here’s where I did the really stupid thing: I didn’t check the URL.  What I really should have done was actually enter the URL I would have expected directly into the browser, but I didn’t.  I was in a rush, and I wanted to get it done.

I tried my account details, and nothing much happened.  I tried them again.  And then I looked at the URL in the browser bar.  That’s not right…

This was the point when I didn’t panic, but moved quickly.  I closed the page in my browser with the phishing site, and I opened a new one, into which I typed the correct URL.  I logged in with my credentials, and went straight to the account page, where I changed my password to a new, strong, machine-generated password.  I checked to see that the rest of the account details – including payment details – hadn’t been tampered with.  And I was done.

There’s something else that I did right, and this is important: I used a different set of account details (username and password) for this site to any other site to which I’m subscribed.  I use a password keeper (there are some good ones on the market, but I’d strongly advise going with an open source one: that way you or others can be pretty sure that your passwords aren’t leaking back to whoever wrote or compiled it), and I’m really disciplined about using strong passwords, and never reusing them at all.

So, I think I’m safe.  Let’s go over what I did right:

  • I didn’t panic.  I realised almost immediately what had happened, and took sensible steps.
  • I moved quickly.  The bad folks only had my credentials for a minute or so, as I immediately logged into the real site and changed my password.
  • I checked my account.   No details had been changed.
  • I used a strong, machine-generated password.
  • I hadn’t reused the same password over several sites.

A few other things worked well, though they weren’t down to me:

  1. the real site sent me an email immediately to note that I’d changed my login details.  This confirmed that it was done (and I checked the provenance of this email!).
  2. the account details on the real site didn’t list my full credit card details, so although the bad folks could have misused my subscription, they wouldn’t have had access to my credit card.

Could things have gone worse?  Absolutely.  Do I feel a little foolish?  Yes.  But hopefully my lesson is learned, and being honest will allow others to know what to do in the same situation.  And I’m really, really glad that I used a password keeper.

1 – some of them, particularly the work ones, are from people expecting me to do things.  These are the worst type.

2 – quite a few, actually – I stay subscribed to quite a few lists just to see what’s going on.

3 – I think it was a Ceylon Orange Pekoe, but I can’t remember now.

What are they attacking me for?

There are three main types of motivations: advantages to them; disadvantages to us; resources.

I wrote an article a few weeks ago called What’s a State Actor, and should I care?, and a number of readers asked if I could pull apart a number of the pieces that I presented there into separate discussions[1].  One of those pieces was the question of who is actually likely to attack me.

I presented a brief list thus:

  • insiders
  • script-kiddies
  • competitors
  • trouble-makers
  • hacktivists
  • … and more.

One specific “more” that I mentioned was State Actors.  If you look around, you’ll find all manner of lists.  Other attacker types that I didn’t mention in my initial list include:

  • members of organised crime groups
  • terrorists
  • “mercenary” hackers.

I suspect that you could come up with more supersets or subsets if you tried hard enough.

This is all very well, but what’s the value in knowing who’s likely to attack you in the first place[3]?  There’s a useful dictum: “No system is secure against a sufficiently resourced and motivated attacker.”[5]  This gives us a starting point, because it causes us to ask the question

  • what motivates the attacker?

In other words: what do they want to achieve?  What, in fact, are they trying to do or get when they attack us?  This is the core theme of this article.

There are three main types of motivations:

  1. advantages to them
  2. disadvantages to us
  3. resources.

There is overlap between the three, but I think that they are sufficiently separate to warrant separate discussion.

Advantages to them

Any successful attack is arguably a disadvantage to us, the attacked, but that does not mean that the primary motivation of an attacker is necessarily to cause harm.  There are a number of other common motivations, including:

  • reputation or “bragging rights” – a successful attack may well be used to prove the skills of an attacker to other parties.
  • information to share – sometimes attackers wish to gain information about our systems to share with others, whether for gain or to enhance their reputation (see above).  Such attacks may be painted a security research, but if they occur outside an ethical framework (such as provided by academic institutions) and without consent, it is difficult to consider them anything other than hostile.
  • information to keep – attackers may gain information and keep it for themselves for later use, either against our systems or against similarly configured systems elsewhere.
  • practice/challenge – there are attacks which are undertaken solely to practice techniques or as a personal challenge (where an external challenge is made, I would categorise them under “reputation”).  Harmless as this motivation may seem to some parts of the community, such attacks still cause damage and require mitigation, and should be considered hostile.
  • for money – some attacks are undertaken at the request of others, with the primary motivation of the attacker being that money or other material recompense (though the motivation of the party commissioning that attack likely to be one of these other ones listed)[6].

Disadvantages to us

Attacks which focus on causing negative impact to the individual or organisation attacked can be listed in the following categories:

  • business impact – impact to the normal functioning of the organisation or individual attacked: causing orders to be disrupted, processes to be slowed, etc..
  • financial impact – direct impact to the financial functioning of the attacked party: fraud, for instance.
  • reputational impact – there have been many attacks where the intention has clearly been to damage the reputation of the attacked party.  Whether it is leaking information about someone’s use of a dating website, disseminating customer information or solely replacing text or images on a corporate website, the intention is the same: to damage the standing of those being attacked.  Such damage may be indirect – for instance if an attacker were to cause the failure of an oil pipeline, affecting the reputation of the owner or operator of that pipeline.
  • personal impact – subtly different from reputational or business impact, this is where the attack intends to damage the self-esteem of an individual, or their ability to function professionally, physically, personally or emotionally.  This could cover a wide range of attacks such as “doxxing” or use of vulnerabilities in insulin pumps.
  • ecosystem impact – this type of motivation is less about affecting the ability of the individual or organisation to function normally, and more about affecting the ecosystem that exists around it.  Impacting the quality control checks of a company that made batteries might impact the ability of a mobile phone company to function, for instance, or attacking a water supply might impact the ability of a fire service to respond to incidents.


The motivations for some attacks may be partly or solely to get access to resources.  These resources might include:

  • financial resources – by getting access to company accounts, attackers might be able to purchase items for themselves or others or otherwise defraud the company.
  • compute resources – access to compute resources can lead to further attacks or be used for purposes such as cryptocurrency mining.
  • storage resources – attackers may wish to store illegal or compromising material on others’ systems.
  • network resources – access to network resources allows attackers to launch attacks elsewhere or to stream information with little traceability.
  • human resources – access to some systems may allow human resources to be deployed in ways unintended by the party being attacked: deploying police officers to a scene a long distance away from a planned physical attack, for instance.
  • physical resources – access to some systems may also allow physical resources to be deployed in ways unintended by the party being attacked: sending ammunition to the wrong front in a war, might, for example, lead to military force becoming weakened.


It may seem unimportant to consider the motivations of those attacking us, but if we can understand what it is that they are looking for, we can decide what we should defend, and sometimes what types of defence we should put in place.  As always, I welcome comments on this article: I’m sure that I’ve missed out some points, or misrepresented others, so please do get in touch and let me know your thoughts.

1 – I considered this a kind and polite way of saying “you stuffed too much into a single article: what were you thinking?”[2]

2 – and I don’t necessarily disagree.

3 – unless you’re just trying to scare senior management[4].

4 – which may be enjoyable, but is ultimately likely to backfire if you’re doing it without evidence and for a good reason.

5 – I made a (brief) attempt to track the origins of this phrase: I’m happy to attribute if someone can find the original.

6 – hat-tip to Reddit user poopin for spotting that I’d missed this one out.

How to talk to security people: a guide for the rest of us

I wrote an article a few months back called Using words that normal people understand.  It turns out that you[1] liked it a lot.  Well, lots of you read it, so I’m going to assume that it was at least OK.

It got me thinking, however, that either there are lots of security people who read this blog who work with “normal” people and needed to be able to talk to them better, or maybe there are lots of “normal” people who read this blog and wondered what security people had been going on about all this time.  This article is for the latter group (and maybe the former, too)[2].

Security people are people, too

The first thing to remember about security people is that they’re actual living, breathing, feeling humans, too[3].  They don’t like being avoided or ostracised by their colleagues.  Given the chance, most of them would like to go out for a drink with you.  But, unluckily, they’ve become so conditioned to saying “no” to any request you make that they will never be able to accept the offer[4].

Try treating them as people.  We have a very good saying within the company for which I work: “assume positive intent”.  Rather than assuming that they’re being awkward on purpose, trying assuming that they’re trying to help, even if they’re not very good at showing it.  This can be hard, but go with it.

Get them involved early

Get them really involved, not just on the official team email list, but actually invited to the meetings.  In person if they’re local, on a video-chat if they’re not.  And encourage everybody to turn on their webcam.  Face contact really helps.

And don’t wait for a couple of months, when the team is basically already formed.  Not a couple of weeks, or days.  Get your security folks involved at team formation: there’s something special about being involved in a team from the very beginning of a project.

How would you do it?

In fact, you know what?  Go further.  Ask the security person[5] on the team “how would you do it?”

This shuts down a particular response – “you can’t” – and encourages another – “I’m being asked for my professional opinion”.  It also sets up an open question with a positive answer implicit.  Tone is important, though, as is timing.  Do this at the beginning of the process, rather than at the end.  What you’re doing here is a psychological trick: you’re encouraging perception of joint ownership of the problem, and hopefully before particular approaches – which may not be security-friendly – have been designed into the project.

Make them part of the team

There are various ways to help form a team.  I prefer inclusive, rather than exclusive mechanisms: a shared set of pages that are owned by the group and visible to others, rather than a closed conference room with paper all over the windows so that nobody else can look in, for instance.  One of the most powerful techniques, I believe, is social interaction.  Not everybody will be able to make an after-work trip to a bar or pub, but doughnuts and pizza[6] for the team, or a trip out for tea or coffee once or twice a week can work wonders.  What is specific to security people in this, you ask?

Well, in many organisations, the security folks are in a separate team, sometimes in a separate area in a separate floor in a separate building[8].  They may default to socialising only with this group.  Discourage this.  To be clear: don’t discourage them from socialising with that group, but from socialising only with that group.  It’s possible to be part of two teams – you need to encourage that realisation.

Hopefully, as the team’s dynamics form and the security person feels more part of it, the answer to the earlier question (“how would you do it?”) will won’t be “well, I would do it this way”, but “well, I think we should do it this way”.

Realise that jargon has its uses

Some of the interactions that you have with your tame[9] security person will involve jargon.  There will be words – possibly phrases, possibly concepts or entire domains of knowledge – that you don’t recognise.  This is intimidating, and can be a defence mechanism on the part of the utterer.  Jargon has at least two uses:

  1. as an exclusionary mechanism for groups to keep non-members in the dark;
  2. as a short-hand to exchange information between “in-the-know” people so that they don’t need to explain everything in exhaustive detail every time.

Be aware that you use jargon as well – whether you’re in testing, finance, development or operations – and that this may be confusing to others.  Do security folks have a reputation for the first of those uses?  Yes, they do.  Maybe it’s ill-founded and maybe it’s not.  So ask for an explanation.  In either case, if you ask for an explanation and follow it as well you can, and then ask for an explanation of why it’s important in this case, you’re showing that you care.  And who doesn’t like showing off their knowledge to an at least apparently interested party?  Oh, and you’re probably learning something useful at the same time.

Sometimes what’s needed is not a full explanation, but the second bit: an explanation of why it’s important, and then a way to make it happen.  Do you need to know the gory details of proofs around Byzantine Fault-Tolerance?  Probably not.  Do you need to know why it’s important for your system?   That’s more likely.  Do you need to know the options for implementing it?  Definitely.

What else?

As I started to write this post, I realised that there were lots of other things I could say.  But once I got further through it, I also realised that there were definitely going to be other things that you[10] could add.  Please consider writing a comment on this post.  And once you’ve considered it, please do it.  Shared knowledge is open knowledge, and open is good.

1 – my hypothetical “readership”

2 – by using the pronoun “us” in the title, I’ve lumped myself in with the “normal people”.  I’m aware that this may not be entirely justified.  Or honest.

3 – I’m generalising, obviously, but let’s go with it.

4 – this is a joke, but I’m quite pleased with it.

5 – I suppose there might be more than one, but let’s not get ahead of ourselves.

6 – make sure it’s both, please.  Some people don’t like pizza[7].

7 – me.  I find it difficult to believe that some people don’t like doughnuts, but you never know.

8 – and, if they have their way, on separate email and telephone systems.

9 – well, partially house-trained, at least.

10 – dear reader.

Security at conferences – a semi-humorous view

Next week, I’ll be attending and speaking at Red Hat Summit in San Francisco.   I’ve written before about how annoying I find it when people don’t stay on topic at conferences, so rest assured that I won’t be making any product pitches: in fact, I plan to hold a vote during the session to determine some of what I talk about, so if you’re attending, too, please come along and help choose.

In anticipation of the event and associated travel, I thought I’d compile a semi-humorous list of tangentially-security-related advice for anyone planning on attending a conference or associated exhibition/expo in the near future.  I’ve been to way too many in my *cough* 20+ years in the industry: here are some tips for conferences.

Oh, and before we start, if you’re at DEFCON, be more paranoid even than this, or even more paranoid than you think you need to be.  At most conferences, you don’t need to worry too much that someone might be spoofing the cell towers, for instance.  At DEFCON, well…

  • wifi – if you’re going to use wifi, use official hotel / conferences access points, rather than random ones which have names like “useme” or “theNSA” or “notRussianSpies” or “dataCollectionforFB”.  And even when you’re using the official ones, don’t trust them: use HTTPS and/or a VPN.  You know this: don’t forget it just because you’re at a conference.
  • what happens in Vegas makes it back to your boss – maybe not your family members, but definitely your boss.  I’ve been to conferences in Vegas.  I’ve seen … things.
  • bluetooth – your safest option?  Turn off bluetooth, particularly on your phone.  If you must leave it on (so that you can use your watch/headphones/other cool accessories), then never accept unsolicited pairing requests.
  • conversations – do you want to be talked to by random strangers?  Some people prefer to be left alone, and a growing number of conferences allow you to put a sticker onto your badge which will tell other attendees whether or not you’re happy to be addressed.   These are typically:
    • green: I’m so gregarious I’m probably not in a technical job, and am more likely to be in marketing
    • red: please, please don’t talk to me, or even glance in my direction
    • yellow: I’m in two minds about it.  If you’re going to offer me a job, make a pass at me or we’ve already met, then it’s probably OK.
    • (I have a serious question about this, by the way: what if you’re red/green colourblind and either very shy or very gregarious?  This approach seems seriously flawed.)
  • don’t leave your phone on the booth table – unless you want it to be stolen.  I’m always astonished by this, but see it all the time.
  • decide whether you’re going to give out your email address – for most shows, you give your email address out whenever you have your badge scanned.  So you need to decide whether you want to be scanned.  There are lots of other ways of giving out your email address, of course, and one is to drop your business card into those little glass bowls in the hopes of winning a prize.  That you never win[1].
  • getting pwned by booth staff – how do you get enough information about a company to decide whether actually to visit the booth and maybe talk to the staff?  Well, you’re going to need to approach it, and you may have to slow down in order to read the marketing messages.  There’s a set of rules that you need to be aware of around this behaviour, and it’s that staff on the booth can engage you in conversation if they catch you doing any of the following:
    • stepping on the coloured carpet tiles around the booth;
    • making eye contact[2];
    • dawdling[3].
  • languages – if you’re attending a conference in a foreign environment, you may wish to include a sticker on your badge to let people know in which languages you’re conversant.  US English is standard, but other favourites include Java, Python, UML and, in some circles, COBOL[4].
  • beware too much swag – I’ve only had to do it once, but I did once buy an extra case to take swag back in.  This was foolish.  There really is such a thing as too much swag, and as we all know, once you have more than three vaguely humorous techie t-shirts, you can rotate them through the washing[6] until you get the chance to visit another conference and pick up some new ones.
  • useful phrases – not even vaguely security-related, and this really relates to the languages point, but I was told a long time ago by a wise person[7] that you only need five phrases in the language of any foreign country[8] that you’re visiting:
    • yes;
    • no;
    • please;
    • thank you;
    • I’ll have five beers, and my colleague’s paying.

1 – except once, when I won a large drone which was really, really difficult to get home from the US and then turned out to be almost impossible to control in the windy part of the UK in which I live.

2 – do you know nothing?

3 – this is the tricky one: I reckon anything over half a second is fair game, but exact timing is culturally-specific, based on my observations.

4 – if you find yourself at a conference where lots of people are going around with stickers saying “COBOL” on them, or, more dangerous still, wearing t-shirts with “I know COBOL, and I’m not ashamed”, you have two options: a) run, fast; b) stick around, learn to converse with the natives and end up with a job for life making shockingly large amounts of money maintaining legacy banking code[5].

5 – but getting invited to a vanishingly small number of dinner parties or other social engagements.

6 – if you don’t wash your t-shirts, you’re not going to need to worry to much about [5] becoming a problem for you.

7 – I can’t remember when, exactly, or by whom, in fact, but they must have been pretty wise: it’s good advice.

8 – I include the North of England in the “foreign countries” category.

What’s an attack surface?

“Reduce your attack surface,” they say. But what is it?

“Reduce your attack surface,” they[1] say.  But what is it?  The instruction to reduce your attack surface is one of the principles of IT security, so it must be a Good Thing[tm].  The problem is that it’s not always clear what an attack surface actually is.

I’m going to go for the broadest possible description I can think of, or nearly, because I’m pretty paranoid, and because I’m not convinced that the Wikipedia definition[2] is sufficient[3].  Although I’ll throw in a few examples of how to reduce attack surfaces, the purpose of this post is really to explain what one is, rather than to help protect you – but a good understanding really is required before you start with anything else, so hopefully this will be useful.

So, here’s my start at a definition:

  • The attack surface of a system is the sum of areas where attacks could be launched against it.

That feels a little bit circular – let’s define some terms.  First of all, what’s an an “area” in this definition?  Well, I’d say that any particular component of a system may have many points of possible vulnerability – and therefore attack.  The sum of those points is an area – and the sum of the areas of the different components of a system gives us our system’s attack surface.

To understand better, we’re going to have to talk about systems – one of my favourite topics[4] – because I think it’s important to clarify a key difference between the attack surface of a component considered alone, and the area that a component adds when part of a system.  They will not generally be the same.

Here’s an example: you’re deploying an Operating System.  Let’s look at two options for deployment, and compare the attack surfaces.  In both cases, I’m going to take a fairly restricted look at points of vulnerability, excluding, for instance, human factors, as I don’t want to get bogged down in the details.

Deployment one – bare metal

You install your Operating System onto a physical machine, and plug it into the network.  What are some of the attack points?

  • your network connection
  • the physical hardware
  • services which are listening on the network connection
  • connections via USB – keyboard and mouse, for example.

There are more, but this should give us enough to do some comparisons.  I’d generally think of the attack surface as being associated with the physical bounds of the hardware, with the addition of the network port and USB connections.

How can we reduce the attack surface?  Well, we could unplug the network connection – though that might significantly reduce the efficacy of the system! – or we might take steps to reduce the number of services listening on the connection, to reduce the privilege level at which they run, or increase the authentication requirements for connecting to them.  We could reduce our surface area by using a utility such as “usbguard” to restrict USB connections, and, if we’re worried about physical access to the machine, we could put it in a locked cabinet somewhere.  These are all useful and appropriate ways to reduce our system’s attack surface.

Deployment two – a Virtual Machine

In this deployment scenario, we’re going to install the Operating System onto a Virtual Machine (VM), running on a physical host.  What does my attack surface look like now?  Well, that rather depends on how you define your system.  You could, of course, look at the wider system – the VM and the physical host – but for the purposes of this discussion, I’m going to consider that the operation of the Operating System is what we’re interested in, rather than the broader system[6].  So, what does our attack surface look like this time?  Here’s a quick list.

  • your network connection
  • the hypervisor
  • services which are listening on the network connection
  • connections via USB – keyboard and mouse, for example.

You’ll notice that “the physical hardware” is missing from this list, and that’s because it’s been replace with “the hypervisor”.  This is a little simplistic, for a few reasons, including that the hypervisor is arguably implemented via a combination of software and hardware controls, but it’s certainly different from the entire physical hardware we were talking about before, and in fact, there’s not much you can do from the point of the Virtual Machine to secure it, other than recognise its restrictions, so we might want to remove it from our list at this level.

The other entries are also somewhat different from our first scenario, although you might not realise at first glance.  First, it’s quite likely (though not certain) that your network connection may in fact be a virtual network connection provided by the hosting system, which means that some of the burden of defending it goes to the hosting system.  The same goes for the connections via USB – the hypervisor generally provides “virtual hardware” (via something like qemu, for example), which can be attached – or removed – from virtual machines.

So, you still have the services which are listening on the network connection, but it’s definitely a different attack surface from the first deployment scenario.

Now, if you take the wider view, then there’s definitely an attack surface at the physical machine level as well, and that needs to be considered – but it’s quite likely that this will be under the control of somebody completely different (such as a Cloud Service Provider – CSP).

Another quick example

When I deploy a webserver (using, for instance, Apache), I’ll need to consider a variety of attack vectors, from authentication to denial of service to storage attacks: these are part of our attack surface.  If I deploy it with a database (e.g. PostgreSQL or MySQL), the attack surface looks different, assuming that I care about the data in the database.  Whereas I might previously have been concerned to ensure that an HTTP “PUT” command didn’t overwrite or scramble a file on my filesystem, a malformed command to my database server could delete or corrupt multiple tables.  On the other hand, I might now be able to lock down some of the functions of my webserver that I no longer need to worry about filesystem attacks.  The attack surface of my webserver is different when it’s combined in a system with other components[7].

Why do I want to reduce my attack surface?

Well, this is quite an easy one.  By looking back at my earlier definition, you’ll see that the smaller a system’s attack surface, the fewer points of attack there are available to malicious actors.  That’s got to be a piece of good news.

You will, of course, never be able to reduce your attack  surface to zero (see There are no absolutes in security), but the more you reduce (and document, always document!), the better position you’ll be in.  It’s always about raising the bar to make it more difficult for malicious actors to affect you.

1 – the mythical IT Security Community, that’s who.

2 – to give one example.

3 – it only talks about data, and only about software: that’s not broad enough for me.

4 – as long-standing[4] readers of this blog will know.

5 – and long-suffering.

6 – yes, I know we can’t ignore that, but we’ll come back to it, honest.

7 – there are considerations around the attack surface of the database as well, of course.

Defending our homes

Your router is your first point of contact with the Internet: how insecure is it?

I’ve always had a problem with the t-shirt that reads “There’s no place like”. I know you’re supposed to read it “home”, but to me, it says “There’s no place like localhost”, which just doesn’t have the same ring to it. And in this post, I want to talk about something broader: the entry-point to your home network, which for most people will be a cable or broadband router[1].  The UK and US governments just published advice that “Russia”[2] is attacking routers.  This attack will be aimed mostly, I suspect, at organisations (see my previous post What’s a State Actor, and should I care?), rather than homes, but it’s a useful wake-up call for all of us.

What do routers do?

Routers are important: they provide the link between one network (in this case, our home network) and another one (in this case, the Internet, via our ISP’s network.  In fact, for most of us, the box we think of as “the router”[3] is doing a lot more than that.  The “routing” bit is what is sounds like: it helps computers on your network to find routes to send data to computers outside the network – and vice-versa, for when you’re getting data back.  But most routers will actual be doing more than that.  The other purpose that many will be performing is that of a modem.  Most of us [4] connect to the Internet via a phoneline – whether cable or standard landline – though there is a growing trend for mobile Internet to the home.  Where you’re connecting via a phone line, there’s a need to convert the signals that we use for the Internet to something else and then (at the other end) back again.  For those of us old enough to remember the old “dial-up” days, that’s what the screechy box next to your computer used to do.

But routers often do more things as, well.  Sometimes many more things, including traffic logging, being an WiFi access point, providing a VPN for external access to your internal network, child access, firewalling and all the rest.

Routers are complex things these days, and although state actors may not be trying to get into them, other people may.

Does this matter, you ask?  Well, if other people can get into your system, they have easy access to attacking your laptops, phones, network drives and the rest.  They can access and delete unprotected personal data.  They can plausibly pretend to be you.  They can use your network to host illegal data or launch attacks on others.  Basically, all the bad things.

Luckily, routers tend to come set up by your ISP, with the implication being that you can leave them, and they’ll be nice and safe.

So we’re safe, then?

Unluckily, we’re really not.

The first problem is that the ISPs are working on a budget, and it’s in their best interests to provide cheap kit which just does the job.  The quality of ISP-provided routers tends to be pretty terrible.  It’s also high on the list of things to try to attack by malicious actors: if they know that a particular router model will be installed in a several million homes, there’s a great incentive to find an attack, as an attack on that model will be very valuable to them.

Other problems that arise include:

  • slowness to fix known bugs or vulnerabilities – updating firmware can be costly to your ISP, so they may be slow to arrive (if they do at all);
  • easily-derived or default admin passwords, meaning that attackers don’t even need to find a real vulnerability – they can just log in.


Measures to take

Here’s a quick list of steps you can take to try to improve the security of your first hop to the Internet.  I’ve tried to order them in terms of ease – simplest first.  Before you do any of these, however, save the configuration data so that you can bring it back if you need it.

  1. Passwords – always, always, always change the admin password for your router.  It’s probably going to be one that you rarely use, so you’ll want to record it somewhere.  This is one of the few times where you might want to consider taping it to the router itself, as long as the router is in a secure place where only authorised people (you and your family[5]) have access.
  2. Internal admin access only – unless you have very good reasons, and you know what you’re doing, don’t allow machines to administer the router unless they’re on your home network.  There should be a setting on your router for this.
  3. Wifi passwords – once you’ve done 2., you need to ensure that wifi passwords on your network – whether set on your router or elsewhere – are strong.  It’s easy to set a “friendly” password so that it’s easy for visitors to connect to your network, but if it’s guessed by a malicious person who happens to be nearby, the first thing they’ll do will be to look for routers on the network, and as they’re on the internal network they’ll have access to it (hence why 1 is important).
  4. Only turn on functions that you understand and need – as I noted above, modern routers have all sorts of cool options.  Disregard them.  Unless you really need them, and you actually understand what they do, and what the dangers of turning them on are, then leave them off.  You’re just increasing your attack surface.
  5. Buy your own router – replace your ISP-supplied router with a better one.  Go to your local computer store and ask for suggestions.  You can pay an awful lot, but you can conversely get something fairly cheap that does the job and is more robust, performant and easy to secure than the one you have at the moment.  You may also want to buy a separate modem.  Generally setting up your own modem or router is simple, and you can copy the settings from the ISP-supplied one and it will “just work”.
  6. Firmware updates – I’d love to have this further up the list, but it’s not always easy.  From time to time, firmware updates appear for your router.  Most routers will check automatically, and may prompt you to update when you next log in.  The problem is that failure to update correctly can cause catastrophic results[6], or lose configuration data that you’ll need to re-enter.  But you really do need to consider doing this, and keeping a look-out of firmware updates which fix severe security issues.
  7. Go open source – there are some great open source router projects out there which allow you to take an existing router and replace all of the firmware/software on it with an open source alternative.  You can find a list of at least some of them on Wikipedia – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_router_firmware_projects, and a search on “router” on Opensource.com will open your eyes to a set of fascinating opportunities.  This isn’t a step for the faint-hearted, as you’ll definitely void the warranty on your existing router, but if you want to have real control, open source is always the way to go.

Other issues…

I’d love to pretend that once you’ve improved the security of your router, that all’s well and good, but it’s not on your home network..  What about IoT devices in your home (Alexa, Nest, Ring doorbells, smart lightbulbs, etc.?)  What about VPNs to other networks?  Malicious hosts via Wifi, malicious apps on your childrens phones…?

No – you won’t be safe.  But, as we’ve discussed before, although there is no “secure”, that doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t raise the bar and make it harder for the Bad Folks[tm].


1 – I’m simplifying – but read on, we’ll get there.

2 -“Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors”

3 – or, in my parents’ case, “the Internet box”, I suspect.

4 – this is one of these cases where I don’t want comments telling me how you have a direct 1 Terabit/s connection to your local backbone, thank you very much.

5 – maybe not the entire family.

6 – your router is now a brick, and you have no access to the Internet.

Do you know what’s lurking on your system?

Every utility, every library, every executable … increases your attack surface.

I had a job once which involved designing hardening procedures for systems that we were going to be use for security-related projects.  It was fascinating.  This was probably 15 years ago, and not only were guides a little thin on the ground for the Linux distribution I was using, but what we were doing was quite niche.  At first, I think I’d assumed that I could just write a script to close down a few holes that originated from daemons[1] that had been left running for no reasons: httpd, sendmail, stuff like that.  It did involve that, of course, but then I realised there was more to do, and started to dive down the rabbit hole.

So, after those daemons, I looked at users and groups.  And then at file systems, networking, storage.  I left the two scariest pieces to last, for different reasons.  The first was the kernel.  I ended up hand-crafting a kernel, removing anything that I thought it was unlikely we’d need, and then restarting several times when I discovered that the system wouldn’t boot because the things I thought I understood were more … esoteric than I’d realised.  I’m not a kernel developer, and this was a salutary lesson in quite how skilled those folks are.  At least, at the time I was doing it, there was less code, and fewer options, than there are today.  On the other hand, I was having to hack back to a required state, and there are more cut-down kernels and systems to start with than there were back then.

The other piece that I left for last was just pruning the installed Operating System applications and associated utilities.  Again, there are cut-down options that are easier to use now than then, but I also had some odd requirements – I believe that we needed Java, for instance, which has, or had …. well let’s say a lot of dependencies.  Most modern Linux distributions[3] start off by installing lots of pieces so that you can get started quickly, without having to worry about trying to work out dependencies for every piece of external software you want to run.

This is understandable, but we need to realise when we do this that we’re making a usability/security trade-off[5].  Every utility, every library, every executable that you add to a system increases your attack surface, and increases the likelihood of vulnerabilities.

The problem isn’t just that you’re introducing vulnerabilities, but that once they’re there, they tend to stay there.  Not just in code that you need, but, even worse, in code that you don’t need.  It’s a rare, but praiseworthy hacker[6] who spends time going over old code removing dependencies that are no longer required.  It’s a boring, complex task, and it’s usually just easier to leave the cruft[7] where it is and ship a slightly bigger package for the next release.

Sometimes, code is refactored and stripped: most frequently, security-related code. This is a very Good Thing[tm], but it turns out that it’s far from sufficient.  The reason I’m writing this post is because of a recent story in The Register about the “beep” command.  This command used the little speaker that was installed on most PC-compatible motherboards to make a little noise.  It was a useful little utility back in the day, but is pretty irrelevant now that most motherboards don’t ship with the relevant hardware.  The problem[8] is that installing and using the beep command on a system allows information to be leaked to users who lack the relevant permissions.  This can be a very bad thing.  There’s a good, brief overview here.

Now, “beep” isn’t installed by default on the distribution I’m using on the system on which I’m writing this post (Fedora 27), though it’s easily installable from one of the standard repositories that I have enabled.  Something of a relief, though it’s not a likely attack vector for this machine anyway.

What, though, do I have installed on this system that is vulnerable, and which I’d never have thought to check?  Forget all of the kernel parameters which I don’t need turned on, but which have been enabled by the distribution for ease of use across multiple systems.  Forget the apps that I’ve installed and use everyday.  Forget, even the apps that I installed once to try, and then neglected to remove.  What about the apps that I didn’t even know were there, and which I never realised might have an impact on the security posture of my system?  I don’t know, and have little way to find out.

This system doesn’t run business-critical operations.  When I first got it and installed the Operating System, I decided to err towards usability, and to be ready to trash[9] it and start again if I had problems with compromise.  But that’s not the case for millions of other systems out there.  I urge you to consider what you’re running on a system, what’s actually installed on it, and what you really need.  Patch what you need, remove what you don’t.   It’s time for a Spring clean[10].

1- I so want to spell this word dæmons, but I think that might be taking my Middle English obsession too far[2].

2 – I mentioned that I studied Middle English, right?

3 – I’m most interested in (GNU) Linux here, as I’m a strong open source advocate and because it’s the Operating System that I know best[4].

4 – oh, and I should disclose that I work for Red Hat, of course.

5 – as with so many things in our business.

6 – the good type, or I’d have said “cracker”, probably.

7 – there’s even a word for it, see?

8 – beyond a second order problem that a suggested fix seems to have made the initial problem worse…

9 – physically, if needs be.

10 – In the Northern Hemisphere, at least.